incomplete. The One obstacle, however, to the reception of Reid's system was the ideal hypothesis, or as Sir William Hamilton has more fittingly styled it, the representationist theory of outward perception. In Reid's day it was commonly held that the external world was known through the medium of a tertium quid which represented it to us, and that we had no immediate knowledge of material reality in itself. Here was a hypothesis opposed to our fundamental beliefs, which led us to regard the known object as the external object itself, and not simply a representation of it. Reid maintained this deliverance of common sense against the ideal hypothesis, which he held had no grounds whatever to rest upon, and therefore must be false if opposed to a primary conviction; and his peculiar merit as a philosopher he considered to be the refutation of the ideal hypothesis. This In so far as we transcend experience, when from one or more verifications of the necessity of a truth we infer the universality of the same, when from one or some we proceed to all, the method pursued is a 'priori. Since, however, every truth must involve germs derivable solely from experience, and since every universal truth, so far as relates to these germs, must be uniformly verifying itself in experience, the method concerned must also be a posteriori. 
